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Perkins: Feed-In Tariffs

COMMENT
OVERCOMING JURISDICTIONAL
OBSTACLES TO FEED-IN TARIFFS
IN THE UNITED STATES

1.

INTRODUCTION

In the shadow of the established threat posed by climate
change, the United States and other modernized nations
require renewable energy resources both to satisfy an everincreasing demand for energy and to combat energy-related
environmental dangers. 1 Yet, in the United States, a timetested solution for promoting renewable energy resources is
threatened by out-of-date law. That solution is the Feed-In
Tariff (FIT), and the threat consists of federal legislation and
court decisions that effectively prohibit states from
implementing FITs. A FIT is a mechanism for promoting
renewable energy, such as that created by solar arrays and
wind farms. A FIT helps create a stable, profitable market for
renewable-energy investment by guaranteeing that renewableenergy generators have connectivity to the greater electrical
grid and receive a price for their energy that makes their
business profitable. Federal law, however, preempts states
from implementing FITs.
1 See,
e.g., Stephanie B. Ohshita, Ph.D., The Scientific and International
Context for Climate Change Initiatives, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 1-10 (2007) (explaining the
impacts and risks of global warming); see also Frank Princiotta, The Role of Power
Generation Technology in Mitigating Global Climate Change, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y F. 251,273-75 (2008) (discussing renewable power generation that will mitigate
global warming).
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In the United States, the FIT's future is threatened by
decades-old legislation, regulation, and court decisions that
were' appropriate for their time but have not kept pace with
contemporary energy needs. Central to this threat is the
concept of federal preemption of state jurisdiction over the
transmission and sale of electrical energy. States, learning
from the experiences of countries that have successfully
implemented FITs, have begun to implement FITs of their own
across the United States. 2 In the face of antiquated law,
however, any FIT that a state creates will not withstand a
challenge before the United States Supreme Court. This
Comment proposes a jurisdictional carve-out that will grant
states sufficient jurisdiction to reliably implement FITs.
Part II of this Comment provides a brief survey of the
current rules that delineate federal and state jurisdiction over
electrical energy in the United States. Part II also discusses
three important exceptions to these jurisdictional rules. This
Comment· then examines the FIT in the scheme of federal
versus state jurisdiction. Part III discusses the value of the
FIT and then analyzes the development of current
jurisdictional rules that make state-law FITs untenable in the
current legal landscape. Finally, Part IV proposes a solution in
the form of a jurisdictional carve-out modeled on the Rural
Electrification Act, an initiative that the federal government
launched to promote energy development.

II. OVERVIEW: THE RULES OF JURISDICTION OVER THE
TRANSMISSION AND SALE OF ELECTRICAL ENERGY IN THE
UNITED STATES

In the United States, jurisdiction over the regulation of
electrical energy defaults to the states, except where Congress
expressly reserves jurisdiction for the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC).3 FERC regulates the services
and rates of facilities that enter electrical energy into

2 E.g.,
Gainesville, Fla., Ordinance 080566 (Feb. 5, 2009), available at
http://www.gru.comIPdflAboutGRUlNewsIFIT/2009%20FIT%200rdinance%20CLEAN.
pdf (introducing FIT legislation); see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY & THE STATE
OF HAWAII, FEED-IN TARIFF CASE STUDIES: A WmTE PAPER IN SUPPORT OF THE HAWAII
CLEAN ENERGY INITIATIVE 37-39, (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.windworks.orgIFeedLawslUSAlhawaiijeedin_tariff_case_studies.pdf.
316 U.S.C.A. § 824(b)(1) (Westlaw 2009).
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interstate commerce. 4
This section first explains the
circumstances that warrant federal jurisdiction under FERC.
It then discusses remaining state jurisdiction over electrical
energy. Lastly, this section examines key exceptions to the
rules of federal and state jurisdiction to demonstrate that even
established jurisdiction over electrical energy is not absolute.
A.

FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER ELECTRICAL ENERGY

The Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA)5 and the
Federal Power Act (FPA)6 determine federal jurisdiction over
energy transmissions and transactions. These acts created
FERC and authorized FERC to regulate those areas of the
energy market that are subject to federal jurisdiction. 7 FERC
has two jurisdictional "hooks," or legal justifications, that it can
invoke to assert jurisdiction over a legal matter.s One hook
considers the transmission of energy, and the other considers
the sale of energy.9
FERC has jurisdiction over all facilities that transmit
electrical energy in interstate commerce. 10 A facility has
transmitted electrical energy in interstate commerce if that
energy has been subsequently consumed - meaning used and
not resold - in another state. l l This definition is significant
because it does not require that a certain quantity or
percentage of a facility's energy be consumed in another state. 12
Under this language, if one facility transmits just a single
electron to another state, where a retail customer consumes it,
and a second facility transmits all of its energy production to
another state for retail consumption, both facilities fall entirely
under FERC jurisdiction.13
'16 U.S.C.A. § 813 (Westlaw 2009).
"16 U.S.C.A. § 2601 et seq. (Westlaw 2009).
616 U.S.C.A. § 792 et seq. (Westlaw 2009).
716 U.s.C.A. §§ 792 et seq., 2601 et seq. (Westlaw 2009). Technically, the FPA
created the Federal Power Commission (FPC), but the FPC was later abolished and its
relevant powers transferred to FERC under the Department of Energy Organization
Act. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7101 et seq. (Westlaw 2009).
B 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(b)(1) (Westlaw 2009).
9 Id.
10 Id.
16 U.S.C.A. § 824(c) (Westlaw 2009).
Id.
13 16 U.S.C.A. § 813 (Westlaw 2009); see also 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(c) (Westlaw

II
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FERC also has jurisdiction over facilities that sell
electricity, at wholesale, in interstate commerce. 14 A sale "at
wholesale" occurs when one party sells electricity to any other
party for the purpose of subsequent resale. 15 The definition of a
sale of electricity in interstate commerce is more elusive,
however, because though federal law defines the transmission
of electrical energy in interstate commerce, the law neglects to
expressly define the sale of electricity in interstate commerce. 16
Whether a sale is "in interstate commerce" depends upon
the generating facility's connection to the greater electrical
grid. Electrical energy is transmitted in interstate commerce
when it is transmitted from a state and consumed outside the
state. 17 This does not explain whether a sale from a generator
to a reseller qualifies as "interstate" or "intrastate" because, in
such a transaction, there is no immediately apparent
consumer. IS Without an identifiable consumer, regulators
cannot determine if a transaction occurred intrastate or
interstate. 19 Thus, FERC cannot assert jurisdiction until it
makes this determination. 20
Certain energy transactions, however, have already been
evaluated for jurisdiction, resulting in a sweeping grant of
jurisdiction to FERC. 21 A sale of electrical energy from a seller
in one state to a buyer (whether reseller or consumer) in
another state unquestionably triggers FERC jurisdiction. 22
FERC also has jurisdiction over a facility that sells electrical
energy to another in-state company where that energy
definitely arrives at a third party who is out of the state
2009); cf. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 471 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that mere interconnection to the grid invokes federal
jurisdiction).
,. 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(b)(1) (Westlaw 2009).
15 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(d) (Westlaw 2009).
,. 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(c) (Westlaw 2009) (defining "in interstate commerce" with
regard to the transmission of electrical energy but neglecting to expressly define "in
interstate commerce" with regard to the wholesale sale of electrical energy).
17 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(c) (Westlaw 2009).
18 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 824 (Westlaw 2009).
19 Seeid.
2!l See 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(b) (Westlaw 2009).
21 See Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. at 458 (1972) (citing United States v.
Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 311 (1953); Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Fed. Power
Co='n, 324 U.S. 515 (1945); Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273
U.S. 83 (1927)).
22 Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. at 458.
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(regardless of whether the energy is consumed by that third
party).23 Additionally, FERC can assert jurisdiction over a
facility when evidence merely supports FERC's contention that
the facility's energy is ultimately consumed in another state,
even when FERC is unable to conclusively determine whether
an out-of-state consumer does, indeed, consume that energy.24
Under this rule, Seller X can sell electrical energy intrastate to
Reseller Y, and as long as evidence indicates that some of this
electrical energy may reach an out-of-state entity, Seller X is
subject to FERC jurisdiction. 25
B.

STATE JURISDICTION OVER ELECTRICAL ENERGY

Authority to regulate the energy industry defaults to the
states if Congress has not granted regulation of a particular
segment of the energy industry to FERC. 26 Since FERC has
jurisdiction over interstate sale and transmission of electrical
energy, states primarily regulate the retail sale of electrical
energy to consumers.27
To fulfill this role, states have
jurisdiction over distribution systems, which are facilities that
provide retail energy sales to consumers within the state. 28
State law, however, is not limited to regulation of retailoriented distribution systems, but rather applies by default
whenever FERC lacks jurisdiction. 29
C.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULES OF FEDERAL AND STATE
JURISDICTION OF ELECTRICAL ENERGY

Though the boundaries of FERC jurisdiction may seem
simple, this simplicity is misleading. The division between
federal and state jurisdiction over electrical energy is not as
clear as the statutory language might imply, nor is it absolute.
This section demonstrates some of the flexibility and
[d. at 458, 463.
[d. at 469 (stating that the Court would not disturb the Commission's
conclusions that were substantially supported by expert opinion, and adding that it
was impossible for the Commission to prove that out-of-state energy reached wholesale
customers).
25 Seeid.
26
16 U.S.C.A. § 824(b)(1) (Westlaw 2009).
TI See 16 U.S.C.A. § 796(15) (Westlaw 2009).
"" 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(b)(1) (Westlaw 2009).
29 [d.
23
24
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complexity of the rules of jurisdiction over electrical energy
transactions.
1.

The "Dual Use" Exception

Interconnections to distribution systems are usually
subject to state jurisdiction, but FERC can assert jurisdiction
over distribution systems when those systems are "dual use.,,30
An "interconnection" consists of a physical pathway for
electrical energy plus the agreements between parties with
regard to the flow of electricity over the pathway.31
A
distribution system is "dual use" when it engages in both
interstate energy transactions and local distribution of
energy.32 FERC can assert jurisdiction over interconnections to
a dual-use distribution facility only when the facility is
included in a public utility's open access transmission tariff
(OATT).33 When a public utility company falls under FERC
jurisdiction because it transmits electrical energy in interstate
commerce, FERC requires the public utility company to post an
OATT.34 This tariff is the rate 35 that the public utility company
must charge all market participants that pay for access to and
use of facilities that the public utility company owns or
operates. 36 Without OATTs, a public utility company would be
able to manipulate the market by charging favored participants
a lower rate than other participants. 37 OATTs level the playing
30 See
Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and
Procedures, 104 F.E.R.C. 'll 61,103 at para. 804 (2003); see also Nat'l Ass'n of
Regulatory UtiI. Comm'rs v. FERC, 475 F.3d 1277, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
31 Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory UtiI. Comm'rs v. FERC, 475 F.3d 1277, 1280 (D.C.
Cir.2007).
32 See
Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and
Procedures, 104 F.E.R.C. 'll 61,103 at para. 804 (2003); see also Nat'l Assil of
Regulatory Util. Comm'rs, 475 F.3d at 1282.
33 The National Association of Regulatory Commissioners argued that FERC
violates its jurisdiction by exercising authority over dual-use facilities, but the D.C.
Circuit rebuffed this argument, so federal jurisdiction of dual-use distribution systems
is an inescapable consideration for power providers. Nat'l Assil of Regulatory Util.
Comm'rs, 475 F.3d at 1281-82. If the court had held otherwise, public utility
companies would now have an incentive to dodge federal jurisdiction simply by using
dual-use facilities. Id. at 1282 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
34 18 C.F.R. § 35.28 (Westlaw 2009).
3S The rate is in dollars per unit of energy, such as dollars per kW-month.
See,
e.g., Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. FERC, 210 F.3d 403, 405 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
36 18 C.F.R. § 35.28 (Westlaw 2009).
37 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 533 F.3d 820, 822 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also
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field among energy-industry participants. 3s When a public
utility company operates, even in part, a facility that is also a
local distribution system, interconnections to that facility can
be included in the public utility's OATT and thus can be
regulated by FERC. 39 This is true even though the distribution
system is normally subject to state jurisdiction.40

2.

The QualifYing Facility Exception: The "PURPA Sale"

FERC can delegate its regulatory authority to the states in
certain circumstances. 41 The FPA permits an energy-producing
facility that meets certain criteria42 to register as a "qualifying
facility" (QF).43 PURPA authorizes states, rather than FERC,
to regulate sales of energy from QFs to utility companies when
the QF sells all of its power to a utility company.44 State
regulation includes regulation of the price that the QF can ask
fior 1't s energy. 45
A sale of energy by a state-regulated QF is known as a
"PURPA sale.,,46 PURPA sales are by definition wholesale sales
- that is, sales for resale - because PURPA explicitly denied
FERC the authority to make rules that would authorize a QF
to make a non-resale sale. 47 Congress initiated PURPA sales to
foster the development of renewable-energy generators by
Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 680-81 (D.C. Cir.
2000); Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Nondiscriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,541 (May 10, 1996).
38 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 533 F.3d at 822; see also Transmission Access Policy
Study Group, 225 F.3d at 680-81; Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open
Access Nondiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. at
21,541.
39 Nat'l Ass'll ofRegulatory Util. Comm'rs, 475 F.3d at 1282.
4°Id.
41 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2601 et seq. (Westlaw 2009).
42 A QF must (1) meet maximum-size criteria, (2) meet fuel-use criteria, and (3)
file with FERC. 18 C.F.R. § 292.203 (Westlaw 2009).
43 40 C.F.R. § 72.2 (Westlaw 2009) ("Qualifying facility (QF) means a 'qualifying
small power production facility' within the meaning of [16 U.S.C. § 796](17)(C) ... or a
'qualifying cogeneration facility' within the meaning of [16 U.S.C. § 796] (18)(B)").
44 16 U.S.C.A. § 824a-3 (Westlaw 2009); 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.303(c), 292.306(a)
(Westlaw 2009).
45 18 C.F.R. § 292.302(e)(1) (2009).
46 Comments of the Transmission Access Policy Study Group, Docket No. RM0536-000 (2005), available at http://www.appanet.orgifileslPDFslAPPA_Cmts_RM0536_11-8-05%5Basfiled%5D.pdf; see also 16 U.S.C.A. § 824a-3 (Westlaw 2009).
47 16 U.S.C.A. § 824a-3(a) (Westlaw 2009).
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requiring public utility companies to buy energy from and sell
energy to renewable-energy generators at a price that was
determined by the states but bounded by FERC. 48 PURPA
sales are known as "avoided-cost"49 sales because, by statute,
the price that a QF charges a public utility to buy the QF's
energy cannot exceed the price that a public utility would pay
to generate the energy itself. 50 Furthermore, a rate can be
lower than the avoided-cost amount only if such a rate (1)
would "[b]e just and reasonable to the electric consumer," (2)
would serve the interest of the public, and (3) would not
discriminate against renewable facilities. 51

3.

The On-Site Exception

FERC has declined to assert jurisdiction when a retail
customer installs a generator that produces energy that is
consumed where it is generated, known as "on-site"
consumption. 52 Jurisdiction in such an instance defaults to the
state. 53 FERC declines to assert jurisdiction even if the on-site
generator participates in net metering, so long as the site never
generates more than it consumes. 54 "Net metering" permits a
retail customer to send energy (created on the customer's own
site using a generator such as a solar array) back to the public
utility company to which the customer connects, effectively
rewinding the customer's electric meter so that the customer
only pays the public utility for a "net" amount of energy
calculated as the amount consumed from the public utility
minus the amount provided to the public utility. 55 This is
significant because energy produced from a net-metered solar
site can conceivably enter interstate commerce,56 and as
Id.
49 Conn. Light & Power Co., 71 F.E.RC. 'II 61,035, at 61,153 (1995) (noting that
FERC concluded that states "may not impose rates that exceed avoided cost for sales by
qualifying facilities ... at wholesale").
60 16 U.S.C.A. § 824a-3(b) (Westlaw 2009).
51 18 C.F.R § 292.304(a) (Westlaw 2009).
52 Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures 104
F.E.R.C. 'II 61,103 at para. 805 (2003).
53 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(b)(1) (Westlaw 2009).
il4 See MidAmerican Energy Co., 94 F.E.RC. 'II 61,340, at 62,263 (2001) .
.. 16 U.s.C.A. § 2621(d)(1l) (Westlaw 2009); see also Cal. Pub. Util. Code §§
2827.9(b)(4), 2827.10(a)(4) (Westlaw 2009).
66 See MidAmerican Energy Co., 94 F.E.RC. 'II 61,340, at 62,262 (2001).
48
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otherwise justify FERC

FEED-IN TARIFFS: EFFECTIVE BUT UNSUPPORTABLE UNDER
U.S. LAW

The FIT is a measurably effective mechanism for
promoting renewable energy, but a state's authority to
implement this mechanism is painfully tenuous. This section
first discusses the value of the FIT. Then, this section analyzes
the case law that makes a state-implemented FIT so untenable.
A.

FEED-IN TARIFFS ARE A PROVEN METHOD FOR PROMOTING
RENEWABLE-ENERGY GENERATION

The FIT is a means of promoting renewable energy. The
FIT is a mechanism for renewable-energy generators to sell
power to a public utility at predefined terms and conditions,
without contract negotiations. 58 The FIT is a designated price
(sometimes coupled with a designated purchase requirement)
that a public utility company must pay whenever it buys
energy from a renewable-energy producer. 59 The purpose of
these tariffs is to encourage renewable-energy production60 by
guaranteeing that renewable-energy generators have
connectivity to the grid and receive a price for their energy that
makes their business profitable. 6!
FITs have the added
advantage of stabilizing renewable-energy markets, thus
lowering the risk to investors and, as a result, the cost of
renewable energy.62
FITs have been a proven success, and their

., Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. at 458-69.
" See Dr. Jan Hamrin, China's New Renewable Energy Law: The California
Connection, 36 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 413, 430 n.4 (2006).
59 See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 399.20(d) (Westlaw 2009); see also Feed-in
Tariffs' Potential Role in US Renewable Power Development (Sept. 2, 2008), available
at http://www.cera.com/aspx/cdalclientireport/reportpreview .aspx?CID=9707 &KID=9.
'" See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 399.20(a) (Westlaw 2009); A.B. 1969, 20052006 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) (adding section 399.20 to the Public Utilities Code).
61 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE STATE OF HAWAII, FEED-IN TARIFF
CASE STUDIES: A WmTE PAPER IN SUPPORT OF THE HAWAII CLEAN ENERGY INITIATIVE 7
(Sept.
2008),
available
at
http://www.windworks.orglFeedLawslUSAlhawaii3eedin_tarifLcase_studies.pdf.
62 Id. at 9.
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In Germany, where FITs
implementation is spreading.
primarily originate, FITs have contributed to increasing the
country's non-hydroelectric renewable-energy generation from
about 1% of the country's generation in 1990 to about 14% in
2007. 63 Spain implemented FITs to successfully grow its windgenerated renewable-energy sector and has now updated its
laws to promote other segments of the renewable-energy
market. 64 FITs have also seen success in Portugal, France,
Denmark, and Canada. 65 In the United States, Florida,66
Minnesota, Rhode Island, Michigan, Hawaii, Illinois,
California, and Vermont have introduced FIT legislation. 67 The
success and continuing adoption of FITs indicate that, in the
absence of a federal implementation, states must retain the
regulatory authority to implement FITs in order to take
advantage of this incentive for renewable-energy generation.
B.

STATE AsSERTIONS OF THE JURISDICTION NECESSARY TO
IMPLEMENT FEED-IN TARIFFS WILL NOT SURVIVE A
CHALLENGE BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

Jurisdictional conflicts make FITs generally unenforceable
by any regulatory body other than FERC. Based on current
federal law regarding jurisdiction over energy facilities, states
lack the authority to implement FITs because FERC regulates
the price of wholesale sales of electrical energy in interstate
commerce. 6B Under a FIT, a renewable-energy generator's sale
is a sale at wholesale because the generator is selling the
energy for subsequent resale.
If that renewable-energy
generator sells that energy in interstate commerce, then FERC
jurisdiction applies and states lose the authority to designate
Id. at 12.
!d. at 14 .
.. Id. at 15-23 (including an increased energy market in Portugal, a stronger
photovoltaic industry in France, the highest percentage of renewable energy of any
state in the European Union in Denmark, and a boost in wind and solar power in
Canada).
66 Gainesville,
Fla., Ordinance 080566 (Feb. 5, 2009) available at
http://www.gru.comlPdf/AboutGRUfNews/FIT/2009%20FIT%200rdinance%20CLEAN.
pdf (introducing FIT legislation).
67 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE STATE OF HAWAII, FEED-IN TARIFF
CASE STUDIES: A WIllTE PAPER IN SUPPORT OF THE HAWAII CLEAN ENERGY INITIATIVE
37-39,
(Sept.
2008),
available
at
http://www.windworks.orglFeedLawslUSAlhawaiiJeedin_tariff_case_studies.pdf.
68 See 16 U.S.C.A. 824a-3(b) (Westlaw 2009).
63

64
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FIT pricing, thus eliminating the FIT. Case law indicates that
electrical energy from a renewable-energy generator is likely to
be classified as participating in interstate commerce, thus
subjecting the facility to FERC jurisdiction and rendering
states incapable of enacting FITs.69

1.

Commingling Theory: FERC's Jurisdictional Sweep

Case law establishes that FERC has jurisdiction over sales
of energy from renewable generating facilities to in-state public
utility companies. 70 The Supreme Court has held that when an
entity generates electrical energy and that energy is
transmitted - even indirectly - in interstate commerce, that
entity is subject to the jurisdiction of the federal authority for
energy regulation.71 This ruling remains good law.72 The
reasoning, however, is out of date. FERC jurisdictional rules
were largely established years before PURPA was written into
law, and those pre-PURPA jurisdictional rules still apply,
inhibiting modern FITs.73
In Federal Power Commission v. Florida Power & Light
Co., the Supreme Court provided a sweeping grant of
jurisdiction to federal regulators, but the grant was both
avoidable and unnecessary. The controversy that led to this
grant of jurisdiction centered upon Florida Power & Light Co.
(FP&L), a public utility company.74
The Federal Power
Commission, the predecessor of FERC, sought jurisdiction over
75
FP&L.
FP&L did not connect to any out-of-state utility
company and so did not conduct any direct transmissions of
electrical energy to out-of-state buyers. 76 Such transmissions
would certainly have subjected FP&L to federal regulation. 77
However, FP&L was also a member of the Interconnected
Systems Group (lSG), a national network of utilities that
automatically provided power across state lines in
See Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. at 471 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See Id. at 454-55 (majority opinion).
71 Id. at 455-56.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 455-57.
75 Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. at 455.
76 Id. at 456-57.
77 Id. at 458.

69

70
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emergencies. 78 Federal regulators had evidence that FP&L
sent power to an out-of-state utility through the ISG system79
and could have used that evidence to justifY federal jurisdiction
over FP&L. 80
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court took a different
approach. Though FP&L did not directly transmit energy to an
out-of-state entity, FP&L did connect to the Florida Power
Corporation. 81 The Florida Power Corporation connected to a
utility company in Georgia82 and regularly exchanged power
with that company.83 The Court accepted the Federal Power
Commission's theory that FP&L energy commingled with
Florida Power Corporation energy and as a result was probably
transmitted to Georgia, thus subjecting FP&L to federal
jurisdiction.84
FP&L connected to the Florida Power Corporation over a
three-strand power line, called a "bus."85 The Federal Power
Commission contended that the bus acted as a reservoir where
energy commingled. 86 FP&L countered that a bus was not a
pool of energy where electrons commingle, but rather a line
that receives and loses energy at discrete, identifiable points. 87
FP&L contended that the nature of the line established that
power from FP&L would be drawn off the line without ever
crossing to Georgia. S8 The Court, however, accepted the
commingling theory of the Federal Power Commission's expert
- even though the expert admitted that commingling was not
established as scientific face 9 - by determining that expert
testimony may qualifY as substantial evidence. 9o Substantial
evidence is conclusive in the judicial review of a FERC order,91
and the Court expressly declined to apply a standard of
78Id. at 457.
79Id.

See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 319 U.S. 61, 70 (1943).
Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. at 456-57.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 457 .
.. Id. at 461-69.
85 Id. at 462.
88 Id. at 462-63.
87 Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. at 462.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 464 n.13.
90 Id. at 462-68.
80

81

91

16 U.S.C.A. § 825.{b) (Westlaw 2009).
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scientific certainty.92 This interpretation by the Supreme Court
of the substantial-evidence standard gave the Federal Power
Commission a much greater likelihood of establishing
jurisdiction over a facility, because theory would suffice where
proof had not been obtained.
The dissenting Justices in Florida Power & Light
presciently noted the ramifications of the majority's decision. 93
Keeping in mind that any interstate transmission of power, no
matter how small, is sufficient for federal jurisdiction to
attach,94 the dissenting Justices noted that every non-isolated
energy facility is subject to federal jurisdiction. 95 The Supreme
Court effectively reversed the burden of proof in jurisdictional
conflicts. Instead of requiring federal regulators to prove that
a generator's energy actually flows in interstate commerce,
regulators can assume the hypothetical flow based on
commingling theory. As a result, power providers shoulder the
burden of proving that their energy does not cross state lines.
Under such a scheme, FERC effectively holds jurisdiction over
any sale of energy at wholesale unless the generating facility
can demonstrate that its power does not enter interstate
commerce.
Thus, states can only regulate the rates of
renewable-energy generators that demonstrably avoid
interstate transmission; therefore, states can apply FITs only
to such facilities.

2.

Feed-In Tariffs Win a Battle but Lose the War: The
Consequences ofConsolidated Edison

In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission,
FITs won a state battle but lost a federal war. In 1984, the
New York Court of Appeals examined whether PURPA
preempted states from requiring electric utilities to purchase
power from federal qualifying facilities at rates in excess of the
PURPA avoided-cost limit. 96 The New York Court of Appeals
held that PURPA permitted states to exceed PURPA limits,

Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. at 467.
Id. at 470-71 (Douglas, J., dissenting,joined by Burger, C.J.).
94 See id. at 461 n.10 (majority opinion) .
.. Id. at 470-71 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
96 Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 63 N.Y.2d 424 (1984),
appeal dismissed, 470 U.S. 1075 (1985).
92

93
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and this ruling remains the law in New York State. 97
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court denied review
due to lack of a federal question, and FERC directly repudiated
the position of the New York Court of Appeals by changing the
regulatory language upon which New York's highest court
based its decision. 98
In Consolidated Edison, the state of New York passed a
law requiring all utility companies to purchase energy from
state qualifying facilities at a rate of not less than six cents per
kW-hour, even though such a rate exceeded the avoided cost of
the state utility companies. 99 Often, generators that qualified
as state qualifYing facilities also qualified as federal qualifYing
facilities under the FPA and, as a result, state law forced
utility companies to pay more than avoided-cost rates to federal
qualifYing facilities. 100 Consolidated Edison, a public utility
company, argued that New York's law was preempted by
PURPA. lOl The New York Court of Appeals held that PURPA's
avoided-cost rate provided a ceiling to rate-setting by federal
regulations, but it did not prevent state law from increasing
rates to further promote renewable energy.l02 The New York
Court of Appeals based its decision on PURPA's legislative
history and, more solidly, on the Preamble to FERC Rules. l03
The Preamble, from 1980, notes that "[s]tates are free, under
their own authority, to enact laws or regulations providing for
rates which would result in even greater encouragement of
[renewable energy] technologies.,,104
The ruling was a valiant attempt on the part of the New
York Court of Appeals to encourage states to promote
alternative energy, but it was a strategy doomed to failure on a
national scale. FERC has authority over wholesale sales of
electrical energy in interstate commerce. 105 PURPA gave FERC
the power to delegate ratemaking authority to states, but
FERC applied an avoided-cost cap to that rate making
Id. at 433.
Conn. Light & Power Co., 71 F.E.R.C. 'II 61,035, at 61,052-53 (1995).
99 Consolo Edison Co. ofN Y., 63 N.Y.2d at 435 n.6.
100 Id. at 432, 435 n.6.
101 Id. at 433.
102 Id. at 435-36.
IOJ Id. at 436.
104 Id. at 436 n.8.
lOS 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(b)(1), (d) (Westlaw 2009).
97

98
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authority. lOS Neither PURPA nor FERC's regulations give
states the authority to exceed FERC's avoided-cost cap on
federal qualifying-facility rates. The New York Court of
Appeals took advantage of the Preamble to FERC's regulation,
but FERC took note and subsequently explained that FERC
regulations and PURPA do not permit federal qualifyingfacility rates, at wholesale, in excess of avoided cost.107 Federal
regulators then removed from the Preamble the language on
which the New York Court of Appeals relied. lOS
Today,
Consolidated Edison continues to permit New York regulators
to exceed PURPA's avoided-cost cap on federal qualifyingfacility pricing, but the justification for the ruling in
Consolidated Edison has vanished.
Consolidated Edison did not reach the Supreme Court, and
subsequently the legal justification for the decision of the New
York Court of Appeals has diminished, leaving states that
followed New York's example in a precarious legal situation.
The parties to Consolidated Edison sought Supreme Court
review of the New York Court of Appeals' decision, and the
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for want of a federal
question. lo9 In a thoughtful dissent to the majority's dismissal,
Justice White noted that state courts oflast resort had reached
conflicting decisions regarding state power under PURPA. l1O
Some states other than New York had authorized rates that
exceeded avoided costs, and other states had enforced avoidedcost limits. 111 This issue remains undecided by the Supreme
Court even now as states have begun to implement FITs. More
importantly, the strongest basis for the decision of the New
York Court of Appeals - the statement in FERC's Preamble has evaporated since the parties of Consolidated Edison sought
review. 112 As a result, the issue remains open for Supreme
Court review, but states lack a practicable argument for
asserting jurisdiction.

16 U.S.C.A. § 824a-3(b) (Westlaw 2009).
71 F.E.R.C. 'II 61,035, at 61,153 (1995).
108 Id.
109 Conso!. Edison Co. ofN.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 470 U.S. 1075 (1985).
l1°Id. at 1077-78 (White, J., dissenting).
111 Id.
112
71 F.E.R.C. 'II 61,035, at 61,153 (1995).
106
107
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IV. THE SOLUTION: A FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE CARVE-OUT
GRANTING JURISDICTION OVER RENEWABLE-ENERGY
RESOURCES TO THE STATES

To permit states to enforce FITs without the fear of federal
preemption, Congress must grant jurisdiction over renewableenergy generators to the states. Neither the concept of state
regulation of interstate energy transactions nor the idea of the
FIT is alien to Congress. This section discusses a prior
instance of state authority over electrical energy in interstate
commerce that can serve as a model for a FIT carve-out. This
section also addresses the potential for and ramifications of a
federal FIT as a next step in the evolution of energy regulation
in the United States, but notes that a failure to protect existing
and potential state FITs in the meantime is a needless and
counterproductive risk.
A. THE PRECURSOR TO A CARVE-OUT FOR FEED-IN TARIFFS
State jurisdiction over the wholesale sale of electrical
energy in interstate commerce is not unprecedented. The
wholesale rates charged by rural power cooperatives, as
permitted under the Rural Electrification Act (REA) in order to
bring electricity to rural regions, are not subject to federal
regulation. 113 Federal regulators (at the time, the Federal
Power Commission, the predecessor to FERC) determined that
they had no jurisdiction over the wholesale sale of electrical
energy in interstate commerce when that energy was generated
by facilities that were subject to the authority of the Rural
Electrification Administration 114 under the REA. 115 Federal
regulators concluded that cooperatives operating under the
REA qualified as instrumentalities of the United States 1l6 and
thus were exempt from the FPA, which was intended to
regulate private, for-profit enterprises. 1I7
See In re Dairyland Power Coop., 37 F.P.C. 12 (1967).
11. Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1983).
115 7 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq. (Westlaw 2009).
116 In re Dairyland Power Coop., 37 F.P.C. at 17 n.6 (citing the exception in the
113

FPA).
117 Id. at 15-16 ("The purpose of [the FPA) was most clear: it was designed to
prevent the notorious investment and profit abuses which had developed in the
industry under the domination of the holding companies . . . . We think that [the
exemption provided by FPA § 201(0) obviously discloses a congressional intent to
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In the absence of federal authority, state jurisdiction
applied. llS In Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Arkansas
Public Services Commission, the Supreme Court determined
that when federal regulators lacked jurisdiction over
electricity-generating facilities, state regulators could assert
jurisdiction over those facilities - and thus designate rates for
those facilities - even though the facilities connected to an
interstate grid and therefore ostensibly participated in
interstate commerce.1l9 The facilities in controversy when the
Supreme Court made its ruling were run by the Arkansas
Electric Cooperative Corporation (AECC), a rural power
cooperative. 120 Though the AECC connected to the interstate
grid, its basic operation consisted of supplying power from instate generating facilities to in-state member cooperatives. 121
Those cooperatives then sold the power to consumers.122
Because the AECC sold energy for resale, its sales were
wholesale sales. 123
Because the AECC connected to the
interstate grid, its sales took place in interstate commerce. 124
Such sales would normally be subject to federal regulation. 125
However, REA facilities such as the AECC were exempt from
federal energy regulation. 126
The Rural Electrification
Administration lacked power over in-state electricity rates, so
it could not regulate the AECC's in-state sales to member
cooperatives. 127 With neither federal regulators nor the Rural
Electrification Administration able to regulate the rates of
AECC's sales to member cooperatives, states held rate-making
authority over the facilities even though the facilities
conducted wholesale sales of electrical energy in interstate
subject private enterprise alone to regulation by [federal regulators)." (citing In re Neb.
Power Co., 5 F.P.C. 8, 19 (1946))).
HE See Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp., 461 U.S. at 377, 381-82.
H9 [d. at 381.
120 [d. at 380-81.
121 [d. at 394.
122 [d. at 381.
123 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(d) (Westlaw 2009).
124 See Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. at 470-71 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
125 [d.; see also Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp., 461 U.S. at 381 ("If AECC were not a rural
power cooperative, the wholesale rates it charges to its members would ... be subject
exclusively to federal regulation.").
126 Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp., 461 U.S. at 381-82.
127 In re Dairyland Power Coop., 37 F.P.C. 12 (1967) (noting that the Rural
Electrification Administrator was "absolutely without power in the matter of fIxing
rates within the boundaries of a state").
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commerce. 128
In addition to determining jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
also noted that state regulation of energy in interstate
commerce did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause l29
unless the burden imposed on interstate commerce was clearly
excessive in relation to the local benefits of the regulation. 130
This is crucial because the Dormant Commerce Clause can
prevent a state from regulating aspects of interstate
commerce. 131
Because precedent has established that
generators connected to a grid participate in interstate
commerce,132 the Supreme Court had to evaluate whether
Arkansas' regulation of rates of electrical energy wholesale
sales in interstate commerce violated the dormant Commerce
Clause. 133 The Court reasoned that such regulation did not
violate the dormant Commerce Clause because the regulation
did not qualify as economic protectionism since the regulation
did not bolster the state's economic interest at the expense of
other states, and because regulating electricity is a legitimate
local public interest. 134
The Supreme Court's determination that states could
regulate the energy rates of cooperatives in the absence of
federal regulation without violating the dormant Commerce
Clause would be equally applicable to the analogous
Yes, such
circumstances of renewable-energy generators.
generators would be connected to the interstate grid, and thus
under accepted reasoning they would be sending power into
interstate commerce. Fundamentally, though, they would be
selling the power that they generate to in-state public utility
Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp., 461 U.S. at 377, 381-82.
The Dormant Commerce Clause is the principle that state and local laws are
unconstitutional if they place an undue burden on interstate commerce. See Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
130 Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp., 461 U.S. at 393-94.
131 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 178 ("Where the statute regulates even-handedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are
only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." (citing Huron Cement Co. v.
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960))).
132 See Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. at 470-71 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
133 Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp., 461 U.S. at 389 ("Even in the absence of congressional
legislation, 'the Commerce Clause contains an implied limitation on the power of the
States to interfere with or impose burdens on interstate commerce.'" (quoting Western
& Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 652 (1981»).
134 Id. at 394.
128

129
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compames, just the AECC sold primarily to in-state
cooperatives. As with the AECC, the Dormant Commerce
Clause would be no barrier to state regulation because energy
regulation is a legitimate local interest. Furthermore, the
implementation of a FIT does not qualify as economic
protectionism because a FIT does not bolster one state's
economic interests at the expense of one or more other states.
The state, then, could regulate the renewable-energy
generators' in-state rates just as Arkansas was able to regulate
the AECC's in-state rates.
All that states require is
congressional permission.
Congress created the REA "to
establish a permanent and comprehensive national policy for
rural electrification.,,135 The REA effectively revoked federal
jurisdiction over the in-state sale and transmission of electrical
energy generated by select facilities, thereby granting
regulatory authority to the states. 136 Congress must now enact
a similar carve-out of federal jurisdiction in order to authorize
states to implement FITs to promote renewable energy
generation.
B.

LOOKING FORWARD TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A FEDERAL
FEED-IN TARIFF

This carve-out solution, however, is not without problems
of its own. Among other choices, the United States must
choose whether a federally mandated FIT is superior to various
state implementations. FITs have already been proposed on
the federal level in the form of the Renewable Energy Jobs and
Security Act. 137
This proposed legislation would have
implemented FITs, but would have granted rate-making
authority to FERC instead of the states. 13B However, this
legislation failed to reach a vote in the llOth Congress and has
not been reintroduced. 139 As a result, state-instituted FITs
have not been preempted by a federal FIT, but neither have
state-instituted FITs been authorized by Congress. Statemandated FITs remain at risk of a jurisdictional challenge and

136

In re Dairyland Power Coop., 37 F.P.C. at 19.
See Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp., 461 U.S. at 398-99.

131

Renewable Energy Jobs and Security Act, H.R. 6401, 110th Congo (2008).

135

Id.
139 See
138

H.R.
6401:
Renewable
Energy Jobs
and
Security Act,
http://www.govtrack.us!congresslbill.xpd?bill=h110-6401 (last visited Nov. 18,2009).
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thus still require protection in the form of a jurisdictional
carve-out until such time as a more effective means of
promoting renewable energy emerges.
As that time approaches, this proposed carve-out rule must
necessarily evolve. However, existing jurisdictional law has
not evolved with renewable-energy technology, and a brightline rule granting jurisdiction to states will help the law catch
up with reality for the present. That this rule may later give
way to another, better rule is only appropriate as the
renewable-energy industry develops. In fact, evolution is a
cornerstone of successful FITs around the world. 140

v.

CONCLUSION

Congress has the opportunity to clear the path for the
state-implemented FIT, a renewable-energy solution that has a
demonstrated record of success. To succeed, FITs must
overcome the obstacle of outdated law. Congress can eliminate
this obstacle by creating an exception to federal jurisdiction
akin to the exception that Congress created by passing the
REA. A jurisdictional carve-out for the states would recreate a
familiar jurisdictional scheme and would implement a timetested mechanism for promoting renewable energy. Such a
carve-out need not be permanent, but it would be a useful and
productive next step to increase the adoption of renewableenergy generation in the United States.
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